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ABSTRACT
AFTA is the concept of eliminating tariff barriers among ASEAN countries with
a view to integrating the ASEAN economies into a single production base and
regional market. The main objective of AFTA is to increase ASEAN’s competitive
edge as a production base geared for the world market. The critical step in this
direction is the liberalization of trade in the region through the elimination of intra-
regional tariffs and elimination of non-tariff barriers.
 In Indonesian industrialists view, the implementation of liberalization of trade in
AFTA scheme is not only a challenge, but more likely a massive problem, for they
have minimum competitive advantage compared to other ASEAN countries
(especially  Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand).
Since the 1970s, Indonesian economic development was built on the basic
pattern of the bureaucratic-industrialist relationship, which caused fragile
industrialists and corrupt bureaucrats. These bureaucrat-industrialist relationships
grew immensely in Soeharto’s era, and are still sustained until now.
 Recently, Indonesia had to face the competitive trade among ASEAN countries
as the consequences of the implementation of the regional integration commitment
through AFTA. Moreover, as a member of ASEAN, it looks like Indonesia has no
choice but to join this competition.
 Until now, there is so much resistance in implementing AFTA in Indonesia,
especially accepting the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT)scheme in the
import sector (for both industrialist and customs). The implementation of CEPT
scheme, in the import sector, makes Indonesian industrialists worry of losing their
dominance on local markets. On the other side, the bureaucrats, especially the
Indonesian customs, will lose their revenue from import duty and also their ‘under-
table business’, that causes a high cost economy and creates so many inefficiencies.
Keywords : AFTA, Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT), Industrialist,
Customs.
AFTA HISTORY AND THE BACKROUND CONCEPT
AFTA was established by the 22nd ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting (AEM) in
Denpasar, Bali, on 29-30 October, 1990, where it was agreed to apply a Common
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) on selected industrial products, initially including
cement, fertilizer, and pulp. On 4-5 October, 1991, the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting
(SEOM) in Kuala Lumpur agreed on amendments to the Thai proposal to establish
AFTA.
At the 4th ASEAN Summit Meeting in Singapore, 27-28 January , 1992, the ASEAN
heads of Government, which consisted of all six member countries (Brunei, Indonesia,
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Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) formally agreed to establish AFTA and
signed the Singapore Declaration and the Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN
Economic Cooperation. At the same time, the ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting
(AEM) signed the agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT). This
agreement provided for the elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers within 15 years
from January 1993, which was revised later to start from January 1994, with the
completion date set for 2008. Until then, tariffs would be reduced to less than 5%.
The main instrument of tariff liberalization under AFTA is the Common Effective
Preferential Tariff (CEPT). The CEPT scheme will cover manufactured goods and
processed agricultural products. Considering the rapid development of regional
cooperation in North America and Western Europe, the 1995 ASEAN Summit Meeting
decided to move the deadline for the elimination of trade barriers forward to 2003 and the
coverage of the CEPT scheme was extended to unprocessed agricultural products, as well
as services. Facing the deterioration of the regional economic situation following the
financial crisis in 1997, the summit meeting of ASEAN in December 1998 decided to
speed up trade liberalization by accelerating the period to 2002, with hope of making
ASEAN a more attractive environment for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).
In the 1990s, four more countries joined ASEAN: Vietnam in 1995, Myanmar and
Lao PDR in 1998, and Cambodia in 1999. These four new members also agreed to
participate with the six senior members on AFTA, with deadlines set for Vietnam in
2006, Myanmar and Lao PDR in 2008 and Cambodia in 2010.
The concept of Free Trade Area (FTA), such as European Economic Community
(EEC), inspired AFTA establishment on the way to an ASEAN Economic Community.
By eliminating trade barriers among member countries, the Free Trade Area (FTA)
removes discrimination between partner countries and domestic firms. The liberalization
of trade in the region through the elimination of intra-regional tariffs and the elimination
of non-tariff barriers will have the effect of making ASEAN’s manufacturing sectors
more efficient and competitive in the global market. At the same time, consumers will
source goods from the more efficient producers in ASEAN. As a consequence, relatively
inefficient domestic production will decrease in favor of partner countries production.
This is called a trade creation. However, the Free Trade Area (FTA) creates a new
discrimination between imports from partner countries and those from non-partner
countries. Imports from partner countries therefore may replace more efficient non-
partner products in the home market. This is called a trade diversion. The net trade effect
of  Free Trade Area (FTA) will depend on the degree of trade creation compared to the
degree of trade diversion.
The trade creation and trade diversion effects are static, referring to a one-time change
in the locative efficiency. The Free Trade Area (FTA) also generates dynamic effects,
which refer to long term implications for economic development of partner countries.
Some of these dynamic effects can be summarizes as follow. First, since the market is
expanded beyond each partner’s national economy, the economies of scale in production
can be reaped and thus production of final goods, as well as intermediate goods, will be
concentrated in the most efficient site. The international competitiveness of these
products will be stronger and exports will be expanded, resulting in a new trade creation
effect. Second, direct investment flows from non-partner countries are expected to expand
for three reasons. One is that the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is induced by the new
expanding market in the Free Trade Area (FTA). Another reason is the reaction of
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Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in non-partner countries to the trade diversion effect,
such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is undertaken to overcome the disadvantage
brought about by discriminated tariffs. This is a type of direct investment diversion from
non partner-to-partner countries. One more reason is that along with the implementation
of trade liberalization and other reform measures, the member countries of the Free Trade
Area (FTA) appear to be less risky. The Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) can thus be
expected to increase. A third dynamic effect is that, under the framework of Free Trade
Area (FTA), the pressure of competition among partner countries will be stronger and
therefore resources will be re-allocated from less efficient areas to more efficient
industries (Tran Van Tho, 2002).
As the cost competitiveness of manufacturing industries in ASEAN is enhanced and
with the larger size of the market, investors can enjoy economies of scale in production.
In this manner, ASEAN hopes to attract more Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) into the
region. This will in turn stimulate the growth of supporting industries in the region for
many direct foreign investments.
ASEAN also realized that traditional economic structures based largely on primary
commodities such as oil and mineral were not providing growth opportunities. This was
brought home sharply in the mid-1980s, when their terms of trade worsened. The
substantial decline in oil and commodity prices between 1982-1986 resulted in a
significant deterioration in the terms of trade for the ASEAN countries. These external
negative environments were severe shocks for the commodity-based ASEAN economies.
The AFTA basic objectives are to improve ASEAN economic competitiveness and
attracting direct foreign investment.  Therefore, large benefits can accrue to member
countries with the realization of AFTA objectives, namely :
1. To expand intra-ASEAN trade by tariff reductions and to eliminate non tariff barriers
contributing to the openness and overall liberalization of ASEAN economies;
2. To attract more Foreign Direct Investment into ASEAN;
3. To make ASEAN manufacturing sectors more efficient and their products more
competitive, internally first and externally at later stages.
Therefore, the process of industrial restructuring and upgrading in ASEAN  is likely to
be accelerated by AFTA. This process is considered inevitable as the ASEAN economies
are more integrated with the world economy. In this respect, for each ASEAN economy,
the industrial upgrading will be determined by the AFTA implementation programs. To
be specific about industrial restructuring in ASEAN, it is necessary to know the AFTA
including its schedule of implementation. The program can then be compared to the
existing industrial production. In short, to be competitive internationally, ASEAN must
increase its comparative advantage, such as extensive labors and resources, by enlarging
its market size and economy of scale through the framework of regional economic
cooperation.
Past setbacks in regional cooperation are largely due to the fact that the member
countries were unable to achieve cooperation for the liberalization of their domestic
markets. With each country pursuing its own industrialization policy, it was difficult to
promote cooperation when similar industries were involved. As ASEAN implementing
AFTA through tariff reduction and removal of non-tariff barriers, by using of CEPT
scheme, market liberalization inevitably leads to industrial adjustment and upgrading
among member countries (Hank Lim, 2003).
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Table 1. Intra-ASEAN Export by Country (1993-2001) (Value in Million US $)
Export
COUNTRY
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Brunei D. 487.2 468.2 529.7 446.4 496.4 220.8 375.1 639.5 774.8
Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 76.0 72.6
Indonesia 4,997.2 5,867.1 6,475.9 8,310.1 8,850.9 9,346.7 8,278.3 10,883.7 9,507.1
Malaysia 12,986.9 15,256.9 18,435.6 22,694.0 23,248.7 21,611.4 21,885.0 24,408.6 21,024.2
Myanmar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 236.8 393.5 951.3
Philippines 795.3 1,425.5 2,357.5 2,970.3 3,436.2 3,821.0 4,989.1 5,982.6 4,986.0
Singapore 18,406.1 27,562.4 31,770.7 34,441.4 35,793.8 25,998.2 29,269.3 37,784.0 32,815.4
Thailand 6,008.4 7,991.4 10,609.6 12,111.5 13,525.7 8,314.7 9,901.9 15,099.7 14,356.6
TOTAL 43,681.1 58,571.5 70,178.9 80,973.7 85,351.8 69,312.9 74,935.7 95,267.5 84,487.9
Source: ASEAN Secretariat 2003, edited.
Table 2. Intra-ASEAN Import by Country (1993-2001) (Value in Million US $)
Import
COUNTRY
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Brunei D. 886.3 983.5 1,013.0 2,848.6 976.8 591.1 895.6 534.4 544.8
Cambodia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 549.1 1,091.7
Indonesia 2,658.7 3,270.9 4,218.9 5,549.0 5,413.0 4,559.2 4,783.6 6,781.2 5,726.8
Malaysia 8,903.6 10,947.9 12,522.6 14,682.3 14,840.1 12,940.0 12,412.8 15,934.8 15,254.3
Myanmar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1,038.6 1,113.3 1,319.2
Philippines 1,883.0 2,463.8 2,489.1 4,011.8 4,872.8 4,428.9 4,461.0 4,955.4 4,664.8
Singapore 18,760.5 22,166.7 24,537.6 27,362.2 30,396.9 23,647.6 26,241.0 33,291.3 28,991.0
Thailand 5,671.2 7,079.0 8,820.8 9,757.2 8,121.6 5,438.1 7,987.4 10,475.9 10,047.0
TOTAL 38,763.3 46,911.9 53,602.1 64,211.2 64,621.2 51,604.9 57,820.0 73,635.5 67,639.5
Source: ASEAN Secretariat 2003, edited.
Table 1 and 2 indicates that the value of Indonesia export-import activities were in 4th
position of  intra-ASEAN trading. It could be said that Indonesian industries is not
competitive enough to gain intra-ASEAN market compared to Singapore, Malaysia and
Thailand. This situation could be worsed  (especially for export sector), if AFTA fully
implemented in 2010.
CEPT SCHEME AS THE MAIN INSTRUMENT OF AFTA
The Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme is a cooperative
arrangement among ASEAN member countries that would reduce intra-regional tariffs
and remove non-tariff barriers over the 15-year period commencing January 1st, 1993.
The goal of the CEPT scheme is to reduce tariffs on all manufactured goods to 0 – 5 % by
the year of 2008, later moved to 2003.  As indicated in Table 3, the total percentage of the
CEPT scheme applied through 2002 had already reached 86,85% by member countries,
and 96.24% has been applied by the six original members.
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The CEPT scheme is the main instrument for creating AFTA. This means that
ASEAN member countries shall have common effective tariffs among themselves in
AFTA, but the level of tariff with non-ASEAN countries shall continue to be determined
individually.
Table 3. Number of Tariff Lines 0-5% According to CEPT Scheme 2002
Number of Tariff Lines Percentage
Country
0-5 % > 5% Total 0-5% > 5% Total
Brunei D. 6.260 16 6.276 99,75 0,15 100,00
Indonesia 7.139 67 7.206 99,07 0,93 100,00
Malaysia 9.127 914 10.041 90,91 9,09 100,00
Philippine 5.371 205 5.576 96,31 3,69 100,00
Singapore 5.859 - 5.859 100,00 - 100,00
Thailand 8.747 457 9.204 95,03 4,97 100,00
Total
ASEAN-6
42.503 1.659 44.162 96,24 3,75 100,00
Cambodia 238 2.877 3.115 7,64 92,36 100,00
Lao PDR 1.295 803 2.098 61,73 38,27 100,00
Myanmar 2.850 730 3.580 79,61 20,39 100,00
Vietnam 3.623 1.936 5.559 65,17 34,83 100,00
Total
ASEAN-4
8.006 6.346 14.352 55,78 44,22 100,00
Total
ASEAN-10
50.509 8.005 58.154 86,85 13,76 100,00
Sources: The Sixteenth Meeting of AFTA Council, September 11th, 2002, Brunei
Darussalam
All manufactured products, including capital goods and processed agriculture products
are covered by the CEPT scheme. The manufactured products and processed agriculture
products that involved and implemented in ASEAN intra-region trading under CEPT
scheme could be classified into four categories (as seen in Table 4):
1. Inclusion List (IL) is the list of products that have some character of non-quantitative
restrictions, have permanent schedule of tariffs reduction, and have the criteria of its
non-tariffs that must be eliminated in 5 years after implementing the CEPT
concession.
2. General Exception List (GEL), is the list of products that may excluded with the
consideration of the necessary for the protection of ASEAN member’s national
security, public morals, the protection of human, animal or plant life and health, and
the protection of articles of artistic, historic or archeological value.
3. Temporary Exclusions List (TEL) is the list of products in which ASEAN member
countries temporarily are not ready to include, that is certain sensitive products in the
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CEPT scheme, and may exclude such products on a temporary basis. After the
temporary period, all of these products would have to be transferred into the Inclusion
List (IL) and begin a process of tariff reduction. Products in the Exclusion List cannot
be categorized in the CEPT tariff from other ASEAN member countries. The
Exclusion List does not in any way relate to products covered under General
Exception provision.
4. Sensitive List (SL) is the list that categorized as Unprocessed Agricultural Products
(UAP). These Unprocessed Agriculture products that are included in Sensitive and
Highly Sensitive List are excluded from the CEPT scheme for some longer period
before being integrated to the CEPT scheme, especially agricultural raw materials and
unprocessed products covered under Chapters 1-24 of the Harmonized System Code
(HS) number, and similar agricultural raw materials and unprocessed products in other
related with HS number’s headings; and also products which have undergone simple
processing with minimum change in form from the original products, such as sugar
and rice.
Table 4. Number of Tariff Lines Contained of IL, TEL, GE, and SL Projected for
CEPT Scheme 2003
Number of Tariff Lines Percentage
Country
IL TEL GE SL Total IL TEL GE SL Total
Brunei D. 6.337 - 155 - 6.492 97,61 - 2,39 - 100,00
Indonesia 7.217 - 68 - 7.285 99,07 - 0,93 - 100,00
Malaysia 10.124 218 53 - 10.395 97,39 2,10 0,51 - 100,00
Philippine 5.642 - 16 - 5.658 99,72 - 0,28 - 100,00
Singapore 5.859 - - - 5.859 100,00 - - - 100,00
Thailand 9.211 - - - 9.211 100,00 - - - 100,00
Total
ASEAN-6
44.390 218 292 - 44.900 98,86 0,49 0,65 - 100,00
Cambodia 3.115 3.523 134 50 6.822 45,66 51,64 1,96 0,73 100,00
Lao PDR 2.533 856 74 88 3.551 71,33 36,36 2,08 2,48 100,00
Myanmar 4.182 1.224 48 18 5.472 76,43 33,32 0,88 0,33 100,00
Vietnam 6.296 - 139 51 6.486 97,07 11,36 2,14 0,79 100,00
Total
ASEAN-4
16.126 5.603 395 207 22.331 72,21 33,02 1,77 0,93 100,00
Total
ASEAN-10
60.516 5.821 687 207 67.231 90,01 8,66 1,02 0,31 100,00
Sources: The Sixteenth Meeting of AFTA Council, September 11th , 2002, Brunei
Darussalam
The CEPT scheme has set a local content requirement of 40% for products  considered
as originating from ASEAN member countries if at least 40% of its contents originate
from any member countries. This 40% local content requirement refers to both single
country and cumulative ASEAN content.
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Basic on 40% local content requirement, the firm that is trading under CEPT eligible
product must apply in writing to the relevant Government authorities in his country
requesting for the pre-exportation verification of the origin of the product. At the time of
carrying out the formalities for exporting the product under preferential treatment, the
exporter shall apply for a Certificate of Origin (COO). The government authorities
designated to issue the COO shall carry out the proper examination to determine
conformity with the rules of origin. The COO shall be issued at the time of exportation or
soon thereafter.
Apart from tariff reduction, the CEPT scheme provides for the elimination of
quantitative restriction and non-tariff barriers, as well as exceptions to foreign exchange
restriction on CEPT products. Member countries shall eliminate all quantitative
restrictions (quotas, licenses, etc.) on CEPT products upon the implementation of the
concessions applicable to these products. As regards non-tariff barriers, these shall be
eliminated by member countries on a gradual basis within a period of 5 years after the
implementation of the concessions applicable to the CEPT products. Member countries
shall also make exceptions to their foreign exchange restrictions relating to payments, as
well as repatriation of such payments, on CEPT products.
To supplement and complement the liberalization of trade within ASEAN, member
countries have agreed to explore further measures on border and non-border areas of
cooperation. These include the harmonization of standards, reciprocal recognition of tests
and certification of products, removal of barriers to foreign investments, macroeconomic
consultations, rules for fair competition, and promotion of venture capital.
As CEPT goes on line, member countries have started taking steps to insure its
effective implementation. For one, products beyond the HS, 6 level are being reviewed to
insure comparability of product nomenclature. The ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting
(AEM) has also established the ASEAN Consultative Committee on Standards and
Quality (ACCSQ), which has already started working on the following areas:
· Harmonization of standards
· Testing and accreditation of  laboratories
· Conformity assessment
· Technical information
In addition, the first Consultative Forum on Foreign Direct Investment in ASEAN
Countries was convened in February 1993, and have met regularly, to exchange views
and consult on how to enhance the investment climate for foreign direct investment in the
ASEAN region.
So far, the implementation of CEPT scheme has been made according to the revised
accelerating target for trade liberalization, except for some products, such as automobile
and petrochemicals. For these products, some ASEAN countries requested to be allowed
to postpone the schedule for tariff-cuts, due to the difficulties they faced after the
financial crisis. Under the export oriented industrialization regime, increasingly large
number of products made in ASEAN have gained international competitiveness. Under
these conditions, the tariff-cutting schedule has progressed significantly (ASEAN
Secretariat, 2003).
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CUSTOMS RESPONS ON AFTA
In general, Indonesian industrialists state that they are still not ready yet for the race of
trade liberalization, as Aburizal Bakrie, chief of KADIN, proposed to delay AFTA
implementation. The response to delay AFTA implementation is the reflection of
Indonesian industries unpreparedness and incompetence in facing  region free trade based
on zero tariff barriers. Chief of HKTI, Siswono Yudohusodo, and Permana Agung
(formerly was Director-General of customs department) also mentioned that Indonesia
still unprepared to face the regional liberalization, especially for manufactured products
(Soedradjad Djiwandono, 2003).
The main problem that actually causes the unpreparedness of Indonesian industries is
that their historical development was strongly influenced by protectionism policy, applied
by Soeharto’s regime since the 1970s and maintained for almost 30 years. This
protectionist treatment formerly was motivated by the desire to developed Indonesian
industries in order to fulfill the local market demands, reduce the dependency of imports,
and create job opportunities for the Indonesian workforce.
As the Indonesian population grew, the local demand also grew and this potential local
market must be supplied properly as well. The needs to cover this local market demand
created the opportunity to build industries to meet the business needs. Business created
investment growth as well as the growth of local trade. At the same time, the workforces
would fulfill the job opportunities that appeared from industrial development, meanwhile
the macro-economic situation also grew and developed as the result of these chains.
The development of Indonesian industries, through a protectionist concept, created
many distortions indeed. The industrialists were likely to be rent-seekers, that is capitalist
who try to establish government connections for business advantages. Essentially, they
seek opportunities to become the recipients of the rent that the government can confer by
disposing of its resources, offering protection, or issuing authorization for certain types of
activities it regulates.
In fact, there were strange breeds of capitalists such as crony capitalists and
bureaucratic-capitalists. In addition, there were political leaders, their sons, relatives, and
friends involved in industrial businesses. What they sought was not only protection from
foreign competition (i.e. imports), but also concessions, licenses, government subsidies
(usually in terms of low-interest loans from government financial institutions), and
monopoly of the local markets. As the result, all sorts of irregularities have flourished in
the economy. The rise of these crony capitalists and bureaucratic-capitalists in Indonesian
industries were named  ersatz capitalists (Yoshihara Kunio, 1988).
The partner-relationship between the bureaucrats and industrialists is that the
industrialists paid (illegally) some amount to the bureaucrats to have the legal
concessions of monopoly. This ‘win-win solution’ effected  mutual symbiosis, that is, one
part (the industrialists) would take the advantages from some concessions in their
businesses while the other part (the bureaucrats) got extra income that could cover their
needs beyond their standard salary from the government.
In order to protect the industrialists interests and to accelerate industrialization’s
growth, Indonesia’s government implemented the strategic-policy of Import Substitution
Industrialization (ISI). In the concept of ISI, the rise of tariff barriers were significantly
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allowed. Meanwhile the government, once again supported the ISI concept by
campaigning the statement of ‘I Love Indonesian Products’ (Aku Cinta Buatan
Indonesia). This effort purposed to manipulate market’s mind by using nationalistic-
patriotic approaches. Behind the walls of protection at that time, Indonesian infant
industrial sector grew rapidly as reflected in the Five Years Periodic Development
Programmed (PELITA). In PELITA I the industrial sector grew 13% per year. In
PELITA II, the growth average was 13.7% per year. And in PELITA III, the growth
average was 8.9% (Thee Kian Wie, 1988).
Besides the advantages gained by the industrialists (who have been helped by the
implementation of high-level tariff barriers), it can be said that they also had to face a
dilemmatic problem. The problem had its roots on the insufficient supply of local raw
materials quantitatively and qualitatively. It drove them to find other possibilities to fulfill
their needs by looking to some sources abroad. However, a condition that at first was
favorable for them (the high tariff barrier implementation), now became the constraint to
them.
Facing this situation, industrialists tried other possibilities for eliminating the
constraints mentioned above by trying to persuade or negotiate with customs people.
Some of them had the privilege or ‘super license’ for an import monopoly (i.e., Humpus
group), while others did not have the same opportunity. Since the high level of tariff
barriers implemented intensively (as the consequence of ISI), the industrialists had no
choice but to take illegal actions by manipulating import documents (i.e., under-
invoicing), in order to reduce the cost of goods sold that were significantly influenced by
the import duty level.
At the same time, the implementation of the ISI concept, that logically allowed the
high level of tariff barriers and the restrictions of quantitative products of import (such as
quotas), created multiply effects on customs person’s behavior. Since they played a big
role in export-import activities, the customs people had a tendency to take advantage for
their private interest. Influenced by the desire to have extra income beside their standard
salary, the customs people widely possible to be negotiate to conduct an illegal action as
well.
Long enduring and structured ‘take and give’ relationship nowadays have to face a
new turning point that requires each of them (either industrialist or customs) to adapt to
the new situations. The implementation of AFTA gives the same opportunity for all
industrialists in Indonesia to import their raw material from ASEAN countries with a very
low import duty. In this situation, they have to learn to adapt with their competitor within
free competition environment. They also have to face some trader who might see some
opportunities to fulfill local market needs by importing qualities of goods with a very low
import duty. Industrialist that were formerly protected by government policy or
relationships with customs must now learn to stand on their own feet in order to survive.
Moreover, for customs people, they also have to deal with the changing situations. The
low import duty gives the industrialists an opportunity to import their raw materials and
any components or items involved with the production process legally. The industrialists
do not have to do some ‘under table business’ with customs people in order to reduce
their materials costs.
Since the customs people lost their long standing business with industrialists, now
they react in a manner that could be said to be tight and carefully monitoring to the
customs clearance process. The main logical reason, as they said, is to anticipate the
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possibility of illegal action from importers who might misuse the AFTA facilities of very
low import duties, to smuggle the products coming from outside ASEAN countries or for
the products that contain less than 40% of local ASEAN content.
CONCLUSION
Regional liberalization, through AFTA implementation, is a challenge for Indonesia’s
industries. Considering the protectionism policy so far has created ersatz capitalists and
fragile industries, the industrialists have no other choice but to change the strategy and
make a massive restructurizations in order to create an industry based on highly
efficiencies and competitiveness. As a tool towards ASEAN economic integration, AFTA
main objective is to increase ASEAN’s competitive edge by reducing tariff barriers and
waives non-tariff barriers among its members.
Besides upgrading the industrial competencies towards efficient and competitive
industry, the setup changing of industrialist’s mind and moral also needed at same time.
The dependency of bureaucrats for protection and customs for illegal export-import
activities has to be eliminated immediately. The law that rules about anti-collusion has to
be made and strickly implemented, and to be tightly monitored by the press or other
independent institutions.
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